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Sposoby poznania relacji przyczynowych w ekonomii. Argument
na rzecz sceptycyzmu
Mariusz Maziarz
podstawowe sposoby inferencji praw przyczynowych: eksperymenty, modele oraz metody
260 ponad dwa
Wilson261 Teoria fizyczna
za te korelacje (‘dlaczego’ rzeczy lub dynamika).*
260Arystoteles, Introductory Reading
261 J. Wilson, 2005, Causality [w:] The Philosophy of Science: An Encyclopedia. Routledge.
* Ang. Galileo’s account of the physics of falling bodies initiated a different approach to scientific understanding, on
which this was a matter of determining how certain measurable quantities are functionally correlated (the “how” of
things, or the kinematics), as purposed to determining the causal mechanisms responsible for these correlations (the






262 K. Hoover, Economic Theory and Causal Inference [w:] U. Maki, Philosophy of Economics, Oxford 2012, str. 89-113.
263 Z. Roskal, P. Bylica, K. Kiljan, R.





postulowany przez Homo oeconomicus
dochowania warunku ceteris paribus.
politycy gospodarczy wielokrotnie testowali hipotezy wysuwane na podstawie teorii
264 D. Kahneman, A. Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk, „Econometrica”, tom 47, nr 2, str.
263-292.
265 F. Knight, Risk, Uncertainty and Profit, New York 1921 (2005), s. 233.
* Ang.: The practical difference between two categories, risk and uncertainty, is that in the former the distribution of the
outcome in a group of instances is known (…), while in the case of uncertainty this is not true.
62
rozumianej przez Jamesa Woodwarda266 - profesora historii i filozofa nauki na Uniwersytecie w
ang. manipulability account of causality.
Zgodnie z teoriami manipulacjonistycznymi (ang. Manipulationist Theories of Causation), za
267.
Heckman268:
leczeniem. Problem inferencji przyczynowej to ocena czy manipulacja leczeniem, przy wszystkich
*
przy innych warunkach niezmienionych
(ceteris paribus).
marginalistycznego269:
stanami s i s’.**
266 J. Woodward,Making Things Happen, Oxford 2003.
267 J. Pearl, Causality: Models, Reasoning and Inference, „Economic Theory”, nr 19, str. 675-685.
268 J. Heckman, Econometric Causality, „NBERWorking Paper”, nr 13934, New York 2008.
* Ang.: An example would be the health outcomes for a person associated with taking or not taking a drug. Causal
comparisons entail contrasts between outcomes in possible states defined so that only the presence or absence of the drug
varies across the states. The person receiving the drug is the same as the person who does not, except for treatment status
and, possibly, the outcome associated with treatment status. The problem of causal inference is to assess whether
manipulation of the treatment, holding all other factor constant, affects outcomes.
269A. Marshall, Principles of Economy, 1890, http://www.econlib.org/library/Marshall/marP.html, 14.04.2013.









Modele to eksperymenty, eksperymenty to modele275, zalety
270 F. Massoud i in. Principles and philosophy of modeling in biomedical research, „FASEB J”, tom 12, nr 3, 1998, str.
275-285.
271 N. Cartwright, In favour of laws that are not ceteris paribus after all, „Erkentnis”, tom 57, nr 3, str. 425-439.
272 Ang. Models are intended to describe causal processes or mechanisms operating in the real world.
273 R. Lucas, Methods and problems in business cycle theory, „Journal of Money, Credit and Banking”, tom 12, 1980,
str.685-703.
274 U. Maki, Models are experiments, experiments are models, „Journal of Economic Methodology”, tom 12, nr 2, 2005,
str. 303-315.
* Ang. The epistemic point of such activity is that that the properties and of such substitute or surrogate systems are






276 R. Lucas, Methods and problems in business cycle theory, „Journal of Money, Credit and Banking”, tom 12, 1980,
str.685-703.
277 A. Gibbard, H. Varian, Economic Models, „The Journal of Philosophy”, tom 75, nr 11, 1978, 664-677.
* Ang. The goal of casual application is to explain aspects of the world that can be noticed or conjectured without explicit
techniques of measurement. In some cases, an aspect of the world (…) is noticed, and certain aspects of the micro-




279 z Uniwersytetu Stanforda. Pierwsze z nich -
280.
Machlup281:
278 N. Cartwright, Ceteris Paribus Laws and Socio-economic machines, „The Monist”, tom 78, nr 3, 1995, str. 276-294.
* Ang. The mix is continually changing, so too is the background environment. Little is in place long enough for a regular
pattern of associations to emerge that we could use as the basis for induction.
279 P. Suppes, A comparison of the meaning and uses of models in mathematics and the empirical sciences, P. Suppes
Studies in the Methodology and Foundation of Science, Reidel Publishing, 1969, str. 10-23.
280 R. Bhaskar, A Realist Theory of Science, London 2008.
281 F. Machlup, Situational Determinism in Economics, „The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science”, tom 23, nr 3,
1974, str. 275-289.
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nigdy nie jest pewna. *
282: Model to inwencja,
**.
283
* Ang. To put this statement in a slightly different form, any model designed to present (exhibit) a causal connection
between an independent variable and a dependent variable under given conditions-conditions which may include
fundamental hypotheses and a set of less fundamental assumptions on various levels of generality or specificity-must
display the dependent variable as a logical consequence of all the premises in the model. Since these premises imply the
conclusion, there can be no doubt about the complete determinateness of the result. Of course, whether this whole
apparatus with its input and its determinate output applies to many situations of the real world, or to only a few, or to
none at all, is a different matter. Determinate is only the theoretical conclusion inferred from the premises. Nobody,
however, can be certain whether the apparatus, the input, and the output will fit anything in the real world and will thus
satisfactorily explain and approximately predict some observable outcome of the conjunction of an observed event with
actual conditions prevailing in reality. Thus, the applicability of the model with its determinate conclusion is always open
to question; it is never certain (…).
282 L. Fregel, Biotechnology: Concepts and Applications, Englewood Cliggs 1963.
** Ang.Model is an invention, not a discovery. It may be prove to be a valid description.
283 A. Gibbard, H. Varian, Economic Models, „The Journal of Philosophy”, tom 75, nr 11, 1978, 664-677; R. Lucas,
Methods and problems in business cycle theory, „Journal of Money, Credit and Banking”, tom 12, 1980, str.685-703; F.









288 (2012) – nie
istnieje jednoznaczna droga od danych do modelu - porównanie wyników generowanych przez
284 U. Maki, Preface, [w:] U. Maki (red.) Fact and Fiction in Economics: Models, Realism and Social Construction,
Cambridge 2002, str. XV-XVI.
* Ang. Is economics a respectable and useful reality oriented discipline or just an imaginary toy models?
285 J. Pringle, Models of muscle, „Models and Analogues in Biology. Symposium of the Society for Experimental
Biology”, nr 14, str. 41-68, Academic Press, Nowy Jork.
286 Tomasz z Akwinu, Kwestie dyskutowane o prawdzie,
Warszawa 1998.
287 F. Massoud i in. Principles and philosophy of modeling in biomedical research, „FASEB J”, tom 12, nr 3, 1998, str.
275-285.
* Ang.: The eye of an analogy can be defined as follows: if two different phenomena A and B are described by the same
mathematical formulas, the same conclusions can be drawn about the phenomena A by studying the phenomena B.
288 K. Popper,Wiedza obiektywna: ewolucyjna teoria epistemologiczna,Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN, 2012.
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289 (2008) realizm














290 B. Ryssel, The Problems of Philosophy, 1912, opublikowane na http://www.ditext.com/russell/russell.html przez
* Ang. Causality is a relic of era, that passes by. Reality does not prefer one casual order over another.
291 H. Simon i in., Essays On The Structure Of Social Science Models, Cambridge 1963.
292 K. Hoover, Causality in Economics and Econometrics, [w:] L. Blume, S. Durlauf (red.), New Palgrave Dictionary of








293 A. Zellner, Causality in Econometrics, [w:] K. Brunner, A. Meltzer, Three Aspects of Policy Making: Knowledge, Data
and institutions,North Holland 1979, str. 9-54.
294 H. Feigl, Notes on Causality, [w:] Readings in the Philosophy of Science, Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1953, str. 408-418.
* Ang. in terms of predictability according to law (Or more adequately, according to a set of laws).
295 D. Fair, Causation and the Flow of Energy, Erkenntnis, tom 14, nr 3, 1979, str. 219-250.
296 Studia z realistycznej filozofii ekonomii,Warszawa 2013, str. 51.
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W przypadku, gdy ekonomista, do zrozumienia badanego zjawiska w sensie przyczynowym,
297.
punkt widzenia na skrajnie sceptyczny298 .299
- Sextus Empiryk300
301:
297 M. Maziarz, A review of the Granger-causality fallacy, „The Journal of Philosophical Economics. Reflections of
Economic and Social Issues, tom VIII, nr 2, str. 2-21.
298 K. Hoover, Causality in Economics and Econometrics, [w:] L. Blume, S. Durlauf (red.), New Palgrave Dictionary of
Economics, Palgrave MacMillan 2006, t. 2, str. 285-291.
299 K. Hoover, Causality in Macroeconomics, Cambridge 2010.
300 S. Empiryk, AKME 1998, str. 128.






od danych do teorii
granicy tego, co jest znane.
indeterminizmu. Z pierwszym przypadkiem mamy do czynienia m. in. w sytuacji przewidywania
* Ang. D–N (Deductive–Nomological) model of scientific explanation, event c explains event e just in case a statement
expressing the occurrence of e is the conclusion of an argument with premises, one of which expresses the holding of a
universal generalization to the effect that events of c’s type are associated with events of e’s type, and another of which
expresses the fact that c occurred.
** Ang. Hempel proposed an inductive-statistical (I–S) model, in which event c explains event e if c occurs and it is an
inductively grounded law that the probability of an event of type E given an event of type C is high
302 J. Wilson, Causality, [w:] The Philosophy of Science, An Encyclopedia, Routledge, str. 82-85.
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303 C. Granger, Investigating causal relations by econometric models and cross-spectral methods, „Econometrica”, tom 37,





304 K. Hoover, Automatic Inference of the Contemporaneous Causal Order of a System of Equations, „Econometric
Theory”, tom 21, nr 1, 2005, str. 69-77.
* Ang. Suppose that ceteris paribus the higher the stock of money or the lower the demand for money, the higher the price
level. Further suppose that the demand for money will be lower when people anticipate inflation (i.e., prices higher in
future than today). If people know that the money stock will rise in future, then prices will rise in future, so that inflation is
higher and the demand for money is lower today. In that case, prices will rise somewhat today as a fixed supply of money
would otherwise exceed the lower demand. Now if people are better able to predict the future course of money than are
econometricians, then the econometricians will find that prices today help to predict the future stock of money. In this
case, prices Granger-cause money, even though money structurally causes prices ex hypothesi.
305 M. Maziarz, A review of the Granger-causality fallacy, „The Journal of Philosophical Economics. Reflections of
Economic and Social Issues, tom 8, nr 2, 2015, str. 2-21.
75
1Xt-1 2Xt-2 3Yt-1 4Yt-2+…
1Yt-1 2Yt-2 3Xt-1 4Xt-2+…
*.306
sztucznie spreparowanych danych307:
dobre wyniki w odkrywaniu siatki przyczynowej.**
* Ang. Drawing conclusions whether a causal relation exists between investigated time series and about its direction is
possible only if theoretical knowledge of mechanisms connecting the time series is accessible.
306 M. Maziarz, A review of the Granger-causality fallacy, „The Journal of Philosophical Economics. Reflections of
Economic and Social Issues, tom 8, nr 2, 2015, str. 2-21.
307 S. Demiralp, K. Hoover, Searching for the Causal Structure of a Vector Autoregression, „Oxford Bulletin of
Economics and Statistics”, tom 65, nr 1, 2003, str. 745-767.







308 S. Demiralp, K. Hoover, Searching for the Causal Structure of a Vector Autoregression, „Oxford Bulletin of
Economics and Statistics”, tom 65, nr 1, 2003, str. 745-767.
* Ang. The problem with this approach is that sometimes equally plausible stories can be told for competing causal
orderings. Not only does such story telling not inspire much confidence, it is ironic that a method originated as a way of
getting away from incapable identifying restrictions relies so heavily on having more credible stories to indentify
corresponding causal ordering.
309







sposobu mierzenia zmiennych) w niektórych przypadkach decyduje o wyniku analizy. Dobrym
Growth in a Time of Debt314, w którym
publicznego do PKB przekroczy 90%. Ich oponenci, Herndon, Ash i Pollin315 przekonywali o
316 – uzyskali
311 Ibidem.
* Correlation does not imply causation
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Correlation_does_not_imply_causation.
312 D. Stern, From corrletaion to Granger causality, „Crawdford School Research Paper, nr 13, 2011, str. 1-36.
313 R. Conway i in., The impossibility of causality testing, „Agricultural Economics Research”, tom 46, nr 3, 1984, str. 1-
19; J. Geweke i in., Comparing alternative tests of causality in temporal systems. Analytic results and experimental
evidence, „Journal of Econometrics”, tom 21, nr 2, str. 161-194.
314 C. Reinhart, K. Rogoff, Growth in a Time of Debt, „NBERWorking Paper”, nr 15639, 2010.
315 Th. Herndon, M. Ash, R. Pollin, DoesHigh Public Debt Consistently Stifle Economic Growth? A Critique of Reinhart
and Rogoff, „Cambridge Journal of Economics”, tom 38, nr 2, 2014, str. 257-279.
316 Ibidem.
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b) 30 – 60%;
c) 60 – 90%;
d)
wynosi 2 punkty procentowe (-0,1% w stosunku do 1,9%)320.
próbie i analizowanego okresu.
317 M. Maziarz, Being Good (an Econometrician) is not Enough, „Studia Ekonomiczne”, w prasie.
318 C. Reinhart, K. Rogoff, Growth in a Time of Debt, „NBERWorking Paper”, nr 15639, 2010.
319 Ibidem.
320 Th. Herndon, M. Ash, R. Pollin, DoesHigh Public Debt Consistently Stifle Economic Growth? A Critique of Reinhart





322. Metoda dedukcyjna daje
itd.).
321A. Marshall, Principles of Economy, 1980, http://www.econlib.org/library/Marshall/marP.html, 14.04.2013, str. 465.





323 C. Reinhart, K. Rogoff, Growth in a Time of Debt, „NBERWorking Paper”, nr 15639, 2010.
324 P. Krugman, The Excel Depression, The New York Times, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/19/opinion/krugman-the-
excel-depression.html?_r=1,
325 J. Smith, From Reinhart&Rogoff’s own data: UK GDP increased fastest when debt-to-GDP ratio was highest – and the





budowanych teorii, dedukcji relacji przyczynowych na podstawie modeli z zastosowaniem redukcji
wniosków.
Summary
There are three epistemic ways of discovering causality in the contemporary economics. Experiments
are applied in a limited number of cases due to the problem of isolation and their costs. Because of
these obstacles, economists use theoretical models (i. e. thought experiments). The development of
econometrics led to construction of causality-testing methods. Findings based on any of these methods
are uncertain. The literature review and case studies of recent economic researches show that
scepticism is necessary in causal analysis of an economic phenomenon. In order to make knowledge
on what is a cause and what is an effect more justified, one should apply all three methods.
Experiments should be used to discover good axioms for theories. Causes and effects should be
deduced from theories and models. Then, hypotheses are to be econometrically tested.
